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Abstract
To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take
account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally esti-
mate a job search model with endogenous job search effort along various search chan-
nels that deals with this. The data are from an RCT in the Netherlands in which the
extent of monitoring is randomized. They include registers of post-unemployment
outcomes and survey data on measures of search behavior. As such we are the first to
study monitoring effects on post-unemployment outcomes. Once employed, individ-
uals have the opportunity to further improve their position by moving to better-paid
jobs, and we find that this reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitu-
tion towards formal search channels in unemployment. In general, job mobility com-
pensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We use the structural
estimates to compare monitoring to counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like
re-employment bonuses and changes in the unemployment benefits path.
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1 Introduction
Generous unemployment benefits schemes are potentially subject to moral hazard: unem-
ployed workers reduce search effort and increase their reservation wage. This may reduce
their transition rate to work. Policy makers have become interested in approaches to coun-
teract this by using alternative policy measures (e.g., OECD, 2007). The monitoring of job
search behavior (including the threat of punitive benefit reductions) and the payment of
re-employment bonuses are examples of such policy measures. These measures, as well as
the simple policy device of lowering unemployment benefits, have the disadvantage that
they tend to reduce the quality of the post-unemployment jobs (e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer,
2000). The relative merits of the various policy measures can only be assessed empirically.
In the absence of a large range of randomized controlled trials, such an assessment involves
counterfactual evaluations.
This paper provides a structural analysis based on a randomized social experiment
of a monitoring scheme for unemployed workers. Structural analysis aims at uncovering
policy-invariant parameters characterizing individual preferences and boundary conditions
resulting from labor market imperfections and policy constraints. Our data include post-
unemployment outcomes like wages and job durations. The observation of such outcomes
is important because it enables us to address the extent to which policies against moral
hazard have detrimental effects on them. Moreover, it enables us to address the importance
of two tools that the individual has at his disposal to mitigate the reduction of his expected
present value that these policies cause. First, the individual may substitute search effort
away from the search channels that are not monitored to the channel that is monitored.
Channel substitution may be beneficial from the individual point of view and it may help
to prevent a low-quality job match, but it tends to reinforce the moral hazard problem. The
second tool is on-the-job search. Job-to-job transitions reduce the importance of the first job
accepted after unemployment. A low starting wage can be mitigated by subsequent wage
gains. On-the-job search therefore reduces adverse post-unemployment effects of policies
aimed at fighting moral hazard, while at the same time it does not stimulate moral hazard
during unemployment. The structural model we develop is consistent with the differences
in behavior and labor market outcomes between the treatment and control group observed
in the data.
By structurally estimating a model that distinguishes between different search channels
and that allows for job-to-job mobility, we can quantify the relative importance of the two
above-mentioned mechanisms. Moreover, we may study their interaction. We show that
the extent of channel substitution depends on job mobility. If it is easy to move to better
jobs while in employment then channel substitution is less strong than otherwise. This is
because with a high job mobility, any job with a low wage can be exchanged quickly for
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a better job, so the attractiveness of finding work using all available channels is high. On
the other hand, a high option value of job mobility may decrease the incentive to make
search efforts among the unemployed. If a high job mobility does go along with a high
search effort by the unemployed, then, if actual job mobility is high, the imposition of a
minimum threshold for the monitored search effort level will more often not be binding.
All this suggests more in general that it is relevant to take post-unemployment choices
into account when evaluating the policy measures of the employment office. In the policy
evaluation literature, the role of subsequent job mobility has typically been ignored.
The data concern a sample of relatively skilled individuals from the Netherlands. A
subset of the variables in the data has been analyzed in Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw
(2006). That study consists of a reduced-form analysis of the average treatment effect of the
monitoring program on unemployment durations. It did address the issue of channel sub-
stitution, but the study did not have access to post-unemployment outcomes. The reduced-
form results do not provide evidence for a strong effect of monitoring on the unemployment
duration, but they do indicate that channel substitution takes place. Reduced-form studies
cannot extrapolate such results to individuals in different circumstances. Structural anal-
ysis is more amenable to this. In our present paper, we exploit the advantage of structural
analysis that it enables counterfactual policy analysis (see e.g. Eckstein and Van den Berg,
2007, for a more general discussion of the advantages of structural analysis, with a focus
on unemployment outcomes).
Our study complements the empirical literature on the effectiveness of monitoring un-
employed workers (see Johnson and Klepinger, 1994; Dolton and O’Neill, 1996; Gorter and
Kalb, 1996; Klepinger, Johnson and Joesch, 2002; Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw,
2006; Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Deschênes, 2005; McVicar, 2008; Manning, 2009; and
Micklewright and Nagy, 2010). All these studies provide reduced-form analyses, and many
are based on randomized social experiments. The evidence is surveyed in Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw (2006). In general, the effect of monitoring is stronger if labor market
conditions and job prospects are worse.
Evaluation studies on post-unemployment effects of “treatments” during unemploy-
ment include Ham and LaLonde (1996), who examine training programs, Dolton and
O’Neill (2002), who examine a counseling and monitoring program, and Van den Berg
and Vikström (2014) who examine punitive sanctions for individuals who do not comply
with monitoring guidelines. The latter study finds that sanctions on average lead to sig-
nificantly lower accepted daily wages. Finally, there is an expanding branch of literature
that uses structural models to evaluate active labor market programs (Adda, Costa Dias,
Meghir and Sianesi, 2009; Cockx, Dejemeppe, Launov and Van den Linden, 2017; Fougère,
Pradel and Roger, 2009; Gautier, Muller, Van der Klaauw, Rosholm and Svarer, 2017; Lise,
Seitz and Smith, 2015; Wunsch, 2013).
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Section 2 provides institutional details for the policy that is evaluated in the social ex-
periment. It also describes the experiment itself. Section 3 summarizes our data. These are
from a range of registers as well as from a survey among the participants in the experiment.
In Section 4 we develop and analyze the theoretical job search model with multiple job
search channels and job-to-job mobility. We discuss identification of the structural model
and we derive the likelihood function. Section 5 presents the parameter estimates, the
evaluation of counterfactual policies, and the effects in different labor market settings. We
describe a range of sensitivity analyses in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Unemployment insurance and monitoring policies
and the randomized social experiment
2.1 Unemployment insurance
In this subsection we briefly describe the Dutch unemployment insurance (UI) system
in the late 1990s, which includes our observation period. If a worker younger than 65
years becomes unemployed, she is entitled to UI benefits (provided that some conditions
of her employment history are fulfilled). The entitlement period and level of benefits are
determined by the worker’s labor market history. Usually, the initial level of benefits equals
70 percent of the wage in the job previous to unemployment with a maximum of 138.84
euro gross per working day.1 The minimum wage equals 49.12 euro gross per working day.
The exact duration of the entitlement period for initial benefits lies between six months and
five years (depending on the worker’s employment history). After the initial entitlement
to benefits expires, the unemployed worker receives extended benefits which cannot exceed
70 percent of the minimum wage.
According to the Unemployment Law, an unemployed worker has the following obli-
gations in order to be entitled to UI benefits: (i) prevent unnecessary job loss, (ii) take
actions to prevent from staying unemployed, so she has to search for a job and accept
appropriate job offers, register as a job searcher at the public employment office, partic-
ipate in education and training, etc., and (iii) keep the local UI agency informed about
everything that is relevant to the payment of the UI benefits. If an unemployed worker
does not comply to these rules, the local UI agency is authorized (not obliged) to apply a
sanction to that worker. In general, although the local UI agencies are mainly responsible
for paying UI benefits, they also provide training and schooling. The public employment
1Some individuals are only entitled to ”short-term” benefits, which is at most 70 percent of the minimum
wage for a six months period, but these are not subject to the monitoring regimes we consider and are not
in our data.
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offices act as matching agents, not only to UI recipients, but also to welfare recipients and
employed workers searching for (new) jobs.
2.2 Job search monitoring
The monitoring program that we consider is a nationwide policy since April 1998. The
program was targeted towards UI recipients with low expected unemployment durations,
during their first six months of unemployment.
At the intake meeting of UI, any individual is classified (“profiled”) into one of four
“types”, based on individual characteristics such as work experience, age and education,
and on some subjective measures such as expected job search behavior, flexibility, language
skills and presentation skills. Only those who are expected to have sufficient skills to find
a job (Type I) are exposed to the monitoring scheme we consider, with the additional
restriction that the UI eligibility period exceeds six months. In the inflow of unemployed
workers into UI, 80 percent is classified as Type I, whereas in the stock of UI recipients,
about 60 percent is classified as Type I. Excluded from the policy are individuals who know
at the date of UI registration that they will start a new job within three weeks and Type
I unemployed workers collecting short-period benefits. Exposure to the monitoring scheme
lasts half a year. During this period the unemployed workers have a meeting at the local
UI agency every four weeks.
The intake meeting takes place within three days after the start of the payment of the
UI benefits. The quality of application letters and the resume are examined, the different
channels through which work can be found are discussed and a plan is made about what
the individual should do until the next meeting. Although the local UI agency can inform
the unemployed worker about possible job entries, it is not allowed to act as an intermedi-
ary between unemployed workers and firms. Offering or pointing out specific vacancies to
unemployed workers is the task of the public employment offices. During the intake meeting
it is emphasized that a positive and active attitude toward job search is warranted.
The follow up meetings focus on efforts to apply to specific job vacancies and employers.
During these meetings the plans of the previous meeting are evaluated and a planning for
the next period is made. If the unemployed worker did not comply with the plan, she may
be punished with a sanction in the form of a reduction of the UI benefits. The average
sanction for insufficient job search is a ten percent reduction of the UI benefits for a period
of two months. In addition, reports on search activities have to be sent in every week.
Below, when we refer to “the” monitoring scheme or policy, we refer to the monitoring
that goes beyond the processing of these handwritten weekly reports. This is because in
the experiment, both treated and controls were obliged to submit these reports.
The monitoring scheme is inexpensive. The Dutch National Institute for Social Security
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pays the local UI agencies on average 152.46 euro per individual for monitoring. This
is paid at the beginning of UI entitlement period and does not depend on the realized
unemployment duration. Each meeting includes a check on whether the unemployed worker
is still eligible for UI benefits. Performing this check would otherwise cost on average 17.52
euro. So those costs should be excluded from the costs of the scheme, for each month that
an individual collects UI benefits.2
2.3 The experiment
The experiment concerns all Type I unemployed workers who started collecting UI benefits
between August 24 and December 2, 1998 at the local agencies in two of the largest cities
of one nationwide UI agency. In the remainder we refer to these as City 1 and City 2.
The inflow into UI at these local agencies is relatively large, and the agencies have a high
reputation for carrying out monitoring activities in a highly orderly fashion. Both facts
have played a role in the selection of these local agencies as venues for the experiment. All
individuals who satisfy the policy eligibility criteria as listed in the previous subsection are
included in the experiment.
During the UI intake meeting, the employee of the local UI agency establishes whether
or not a UI recipient is eligible for monitoring. In case of eligibility, the unique ID-number
of the unemployed individual is instantly electronically transmitted to an independent
computer center. This center does not know anything about the unemployed individual
on top of the ID-number. The center then decides based on a series of random numbers,
which were realized by a random generator in SPSS before the start of the experiment,
whether the unemployed individual is assigned to the treatment group or the control group.
Notice that this is equivalent to a procedure where randomization takes place within the
local agencies in both cities. Here, “treatment” refers to the exposure to the actually
implemented monitoring policy, whereas “control” refers to the absence of this exposure.
Individuals selected in the treatment group have to show up at a monitoring intake meeting
within three days, and subsequently in the follow-up meetings which take place every four
weeks. The unemployed workers in the control group only communicate with the local UI
agency by way of sending in written forms stating the current status of their job search
activities.
After the first six months of collecting UI benefits, the monitoring ends for individuals
in the treatment group. All individuals who are still unemployed after six months thus end
up in the same regime which may involve alternative active labor market policies.
The participants in the experiment are not informed about the occurrence of the exper-
2The figures mentioned here are average realized amounts. The amounts may vary between individuals
and local UI agencies.
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iment. In the absence of the experiment, all of them would be subject to the monitoring
treatment. None of the individuals in the control group in the experiment complained
about a lack of monitoring. The setup ensures that the data do not suffer from initial
nonrandom nonparticipation/noncompliance in the experiment and participants can not
leave the experiment for any reason other than stopping collecting UI benefits.
3 Data
3.1 Merged data registers and survey data
We collected information on the 393 individuals who participated in the experiment, i.e.
who started to collect UI benefits between August 24 and December 2, 1998 in the two
experiment cities. During the observation period, unemployment rates were low and the
labor market was tight.
Our data set merges three different sources of information on the sample members. The
first source is the register of UI recipients for the period 1998–2004. The second source is
the wage and job duration register, for the same period. The third source is a survey on
search effort and search behavior, held in March 1999 among the sample members.
All information on events is daily, i.e. we observe the exact day of inflow into and outflow
out of UI.3 We right-censor all observations after 26 weeks of collecting UI benefits, because
an individual enters a new regime of active labor market programs after being unemployed
for 26 weeks (see discussion above). Among the treated, 38.5 percent of the unemployment
spells are censored, while among the controls this is 39.4 percent. Censoring can also occur
if the exit destination differs from employment (illness, prison, not accepting suitable work,
leaving the country). There is no systematic difference in how often these other exits occur
in the treatment and in the control group. With register data, the empirical analyses do
not suffer from selective nonresponse or follow-up attrition from the database.
If an individual finds work within 26 weeks, we record a number of subsequent labor
market outcomes: the gross wage in the first job, the length of the first job spell, the
destination state after the first job spell, and the gross wage in the second job (if the
destination state after the first job spell was work). Wages are deflated to obtain real
weekly wages (measured in January 1999 euros). The gross minimum weekly wage is 245
euros. In our data about 5.8 percent of the observed wages are below the minimum wage
and 44 percent below the observed benefits level. Among individuals with more than one
3As mentioned in Subsection 2.1, UI recipients are not all full-time unemployed; e.g. they may have
lost only part of their working hours and still work for the remaining hours. We simply refer to the period
from the start of collecting UI benefits until the end of collecting UI benefits as unemployment, and to UI
recipients as unemployed workers.
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observed wage, the second wage is below the first wage in 32 percent of the cases.
The response rate to the survey questionnaire was 33 percent. We manually match
survey respondents to individuals in the administrative database. To match records, we use
information on the month of birth, the city of residence, gender, treatment status, having
collected UI benefits before, current labor market status, and day of starting collecting UI
benefits. Due to item nonresponse on these variables, we only succeeded in matching 49
individuals in the treatment group and 55 individuals in the control group. Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw (2006) investigate if there was selective nonresponse and concluded
that this was not the case. In the estimation of the structural model all 393 individuals in
the administrative data are used.
The survey includes questions on how unemployed workers evaluate monitoring and
on which job search channels they have used, in addition to subjective evaluations of
satisfaction with aspects of the benefits and re-employment system. Van den Berg and Van
der Klaauw (2006), using the answers to the survey, demonstrate that the unemployed
workers experience monitoring as controlling rather than advisory. This is important, as
the occurrence of follow-up meetings in the treatment arm suggests that treatment may
include counseling as well.
The main information we take from the survey concerns the use of job search channels.
Individuals were asked to report from a list of possible job search methods which methods
they had actually used during their spell of collecting UI benefits. We define the formal
search channel as the channel in which personnel advertisements at the public employment
offices / local UI agency or (commercial) employment agencies are used as methods. The
informal search channel uses open application letters, referrals by employed workers, and
search through friends and relatives, as search methods. The formal channel is monitored
and the informal channel is not. We keep job advertisements in newspapers out of the
analyses as in our opinion this can be formal as well as informal search – it is not clear
how the unemployed worker became acquainted to the advertisement. In fact, almost all
unemployed workers indicate that they examined job advertisements in newspapers.
3.2 Summary statistics
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics for the variables we use in our empirical analyses.
There are slightly more individuals in the treatment group than in the control group, 205
individuals received monitoring while 188 were excluded from monitoring. Because the
registers only contain variables that are needed by the UI agency, the number of variables
in this database is limited. For example we do not have any information on occupation
and level of education. The differences in gender, the city in which they live, age, level
of benefits and whether the collected UI benefits before are relatively small between both
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Treatment Control p-value for
group group equality
Number of individuals 205 188
Percentage female 38.5% 41.0% 0.625
Percentage living in City 2 62.0% 59.0% 0.557
Average age 35.8 36.7 0.312
Percentage collected UI before 22.4% 26.6% 0.341
Average UI benefits 384 381 0.819
Measure of formal search 0.79 (0.12) 0.52 (0.12) 0.114
Measure of informal search 0.79 (0.15) 1.00 (0.14) 0.322
Hazard to first job 0.0434 (0.0038) 0.0419 (0.0038) 0.814
Wage in first job 413 (14) 424 (17) 0.621
Job separation hazard 0.0023 (0.0004) 0.0024 (0.0004) 0.864
Job-to-job hazard 0.0088 (0.0006) 0.0068 (0.0006) 0.026
Wage in second job 460 (25) 434 (23) 0.440
Explanatory notes: Wages and benefits are before taxes and measured in euros on January
1, 1999. Time unit is one week. The measure of search channel usage is the used number of
methods corresponding to that channel. Hazards are estimated transition rates for expo-
nential duration distributions with covariates. Standard errors of the averages and of the
estimated hazard rate levels are in parentheses.
groups and never significant. Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) provide some more
extensive checks for the random assignment of treatment and conclude that randomization
holds. Finally, we observe if the local UI agency imposed a sanction on the UI recipient. We
do not have any information on the reason why the sanction was imposed or the size and
the duration of the benefit reduction. In the database, the percentage of individuals who
had a sanction imposed was less than three percent among the treated as well as among
the controls.4
Table 1 also provides statistics on outcomes. Monitored individuals use on average
more formal and less informal search methods than the unemployed workers in the control
group. They also have a slightly higher reemployment rate (“hazard to first job”). The
level of this rate as well as of the other hazard rates is estimated conditional on covariates.
4Sanctions are also imposed for other reasons than lack of job search effort, for example because of not
complying to administrative obligations regarding the provision of information on eligibility status.
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Without covariates, the estimated difference of the hazard between the two groups would be
biased towards zero. This is because unobserved heterogeneity tends to attenuate estimated
covariate effects on hazard rates. To see this, notice that randomization upon entry into
unemployment does not translate into randomization among survivors at positive durations
at which hazards are evaluated (for details, see e.g. Van den Berg, 2001).5
Among the monitored, the wage in their first job is on average slightly lower. Here,
a caveat applies that is similar in spirit to the remark in the previous paragraph. Post-
unemployment wages are only observed if they are realized before the end of the observation
window. Occurrence of the latter depends both on the treatment status and on observed
and unobserved individual characteristics. In any case, the difference in average observed
wages pales in comparison to the standard deviations of the observed wages. As a result,
the difference is not significant.
The job separation fractions in the first job are the same for both groups. Further,
monitored individuals are significantly more likely to make a job-to-job transition. The
correlation between the wage in the first and second job is 0.8 and is similar in the treatment
and control group. The average observed wage in the second job is somewhat higher in the
treatment group. However, for such descriptives of post-post unemployment outcomes,
the same caveat applies as in the above paragraph.6 Moreover, the difference in average
observed second wages pales again in comparison to their standard deviations. Indeed, the
observed difference is not at odds with a lower average wage in the second job among the
treated versus the controls.
We measure search channel usage by the number of methods used per channel (ranging
from 0 to 2 for each channel). One could argue that this is too crude a measure for search
intensity. We look into this by examining the total number of job applications made in
the past month as reported by those who were still unemployed at the interview date.
It should be noted that this question was only answered by 46 individuals (excluding
5In descriptive analyses we did not find evidence of additional unobserved heterogeneity in the reemploy-
ment rate (which would have generated negative duration dependence in the estimated rate). We suspect
that this is because we focus on the first six months of unemployment and because the data consist of
individuals profiled to be among the best-positioned to find work quickly. Perhaps for such individuals
dynamic selection only plays a role after six months of unemployment.
6For example, observation of a second wage requires that the individual completes both his unemploy-
ment spell and his first job within the observation interval (i.e., within approximately 6 years). Since job
durations tend to be longer than unemployment durations, this means in particular that the first job dura-
tion should be relatively short. This condition may be easier to fulfill if the individual was treated and, at
the same time, has certain favorable individual characteristics. These characteristics may interact with the
treatment status such that among those with short realized job durations, there is an over-representation
of individuals with characteristics that are associated with a high second wage. Such an interaction effect
may be due to reasons outside of the model, but it may lead the second wage to be higher among the
treated if it is realized within the observation window.
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Table 2: OLS regression for logarithm of number of applications in the past month.
Intercept 1.303 (0.164)
Measure of formal search 0.218 (0.120)
Measure of informal search 0.157 (0.107)
Explanatory note: standard errors in parentheses.
one person claiming to have made 400 applications in the past month). On average the
individuals in our sample make 6.6 applications per months with a maximum of 40. In
Table 2 we regress the logarithm of the number of applications on the number of formal
and informal search methods used by the unemployed worker. Use of an additional formal
search method is associated with an increase in the number of applications by 22 percent,
with a p-value of about 0.07, while monthly job applications are 16 percent higher if the
unemployed worker uses an additional informal search method. Jointly, the channels have
a significant impact at the 10 percent level.
4 Structural analysis
4.1 Job search model with search channels, search effort, moni-
toring, and job mobility
Our structural job search model is a sequential job search model with endogenous search
effort (e.g. Mortensen, 1986), extended by allowing job offers to arrive through formal as
well as informal search channels, and by allowing for job search monitoring. Furthermore,
we explicitly incorporate on-the-job decisions on search effort and job-to-job mobility. Our
model shares some features with the model framework of Pavoni and Violante (2007).
Consider an unemployed worker searching for a job. This individual can search along
the formal and the informal channel, which are denoted by subscripts 1 and 2, respectively.
An amount of search effort si ≥ 0 is devoted to search along channel i. This variable si,
which is also called the search intensity for channel i, is to be chosen optimally by the
unemployed worker. Job offers along search channel i arrive at the individual according to
a Poisson process with rate λisi.
A job offer is characterized by a random draw from the wage offer distribution Fu. At
the individual level, arrival times and wage offers are independent across channels, and
for each channel they are independent over time. We assume that Fu is continuous with
a connected support stretching to infinity, on which the density is positive. If a job offer
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arrives, the individual has to decide immediately whether to accept it or to reject it and
continue searching.
The costs of search are expressed by the function c(s1, s2). We require c to be increasing
and convex in its arguments, with c(0, 0) = 0. Moreover, we require ∂2c/(∂s1∂s2) ≥ 0 for
s1, s2 > 0, to capture that efforts along the two channels are relatively similar activities
compared to most other ways to spend time and money, and to capture that a certain
fraction of vacancies may be found along either channel. In the literature on search models
with endogenous search effort s and a single search channel, the arrival rate and the search
costs are generally taken to be proportional to s and s2, respectively (see the survey by
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). We require that our specification for c reduces to such
a quadratic specification in case only one channel is used, or in case both channels are
equivalent. So, our function c has to be such that c(s, 0), c(0, s) and c(s, s) are quadratic
in s. We take the following specification,






This satisfies the above requirements if ci > 0 and 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2. There are two interesting
special cases of this cost function. First, if γ = 1, there is perfect substitution. In this case
the cost function simplifies to c(s1, s2) = (c1s1 + c2s2)
2, which means that to keep costs
constant, one unit of formal search effort can always be replaced by c1
c2
units of informal





and informal search effort contribute additively to total costs.
The instantaneous utility of income is given by u(w) = w. While being unemployed a
worker received benefits b, the instantaneous utility of unemployment equals u(b) = κb.
A value for κ smaller than 1 implies that individuals dislike being unemployed relative
to working at a wage equal to the benefits level. Individuals maximize their expected
discounted income over an infinite time horizon. The expected discounted income (or “value
of search”) and the discount rate are denoted by Ru and ρ, respectively.
While being employed, individuals can search on the job. Employed workers receive job
offers along the rate λs (with s the search effort in employment) and lose jobs with rate
δ. A job offer is drawn from the wage offer distribution Fe satisfying the same technical
assumptions as Fu. Notice that we allow the wage offer distribution to depend on the
employment status. Because of our interest in the extent to which job-to-job mobility
affects the effects of monitoring in unemployment, it is important to prevent that our
results are biased by strong assumptions on the post-unemployment environment. As we
shall see, the assumption that Fu = Fe is refuted by the data.
Along this line of reasoning, we also explicitly model the search effort decision in em-
ployment. After all, both the wage offer distribution and the job search costs in employment
influence the welfare loss of monitoring the unemployed. The cost of search in employment
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is expressed by ce(s) as a function of effort s. We are not in a position to distinguish be-
tween search channels while employed, as our data do not provide observations of indicators
of search effort or the use of search channels during employment. Along the lines of the
specification of the search cost function in unemployment, we assume that ce(s) = c0 · s2.
We now introduce monitoring of unemployed workers’ search effort into this model.
We assume that monitoring concerns only the formal search effort s1 and not the informal
search effort s2. The local UI agency can check the number of times the UI recipient
responds on a job advertisement, the number of application letters written, subscription at
public employment offices, etc. It is for the local UI agency much more difficult to measure
how often an individual asks friends and relatives about job openings. The monitoring effort
of the local UI agency therefore focuses on search along the formal channel. Specifically,
the agency imposes a minimum search effort (or threshold value) devoted to formal job
search denoted by s∗1.
Full compliance can be achieved by imposing severe punishment for noncompliance to
the search requirements. In practice, the most common punishment in case of noncompli-
ance is a sanction, which is a temporary benefit reduction. At the time of the experiment,
the Netherlands had a strict sanction regime compared to many other countries (Abbring,
Van den Berg and Van Ours, 2005). The data show that sanctions are virtually absent
among monitored individuals, confirming that punishments are indeed regarded as severe.
We therefore simply assume that there is no noncompliance. We return to this issue in
Subsection 5.3 when we compute how large punitive benefit reductions should be to ensure
compliance.
Now consider how monitoring may affect the subsequent search environment in em-
ployment. In the model outlined so far, labor market outcomes after acceptance of the
first job can depend on the monitoring (and on the decisions in unemployment) solely by
way of the set of acceptable wage offers in unemployment. An alternative reason for a
relation between the search environment and decisions in unemployment on the one hand,
and the search environment and decisions in employment on the other hand, is that the
environment in employment depends on how the individual searched in unemployment. In
particular, because the search environment faced by an unemployed individual influences
the way she finds her first job, it may also influence the subsequent success in climbing the
job ladder.
One may consider two approaches to deal with this in the model. First, λ in employ-
ment may depend on the channel that actually delivered the first job. This would pose
major problems for the empirical inference, because we do not observe how an individual
found the job. We only observe the mix of channels that the individual used throughout
unemployment. Barring corner solutions, any given mix may or may not cause the job to
be found through the formal channel. In fact, whether the job was by coincidence found
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through one or the other channel may leave less of an imprint than the characteristics of
the search environment that the individual faced throughout unemployment. We therefore
adopt an alternative approach, in which the rate λ depends on whether the individual
faced monitoring or not in unemployment. As we shall see, monitored individuals in un-
employment tend to search more intensively along the formal channel than non-treated
individuals. They may thus learn to deal with formal methods in an efficient way. This
may be an advantage when searching for better jobs while employed. For example, writing
good application letters is a skill that one may learn through experience, and this expe-
rience is obtained faster when using formal methods. On the other hand, individuals who
are not monitored use informal channels more frequently, and this may foster a social net-
work that is also useful in employment. After all, typically at most one network member is
instrumental in obtaining a job, so the other members remain available for help in moving
on to better jobs.7
4.2 Expected present values and optimal behavior
An employed individual losing her job believes that the state of unemployment is equivalent
to the state of unemployment before the employment spell she just completed. This implies
that workers who received monitoring prior to employment believe that they will receive
this again, and similarly for workers who did not receive monitoring. The optimal job offer
acceptance behavior of an employed worker is to accept all job offers with a wage higher
than the current wage. This implies that the Bellman equation for an employed worker
with wage w equals
ρR(w) = max
s≥0




where R(w) is the expected present value of working in a job with wage w and Ru is the
expected present value of unemployment (note that λ,R(w) and Ru here depend on the







For an unemployed person not exposed to monitoring the Bellman equation is
ρRu = max
s1,s2≥0
κb− (c1sγ1 + c2s
γ
2)




7This modeling approach allows monitoring to have effects even if it is not binding on the unemployed’s
effort, because it allows monitoring to directly affect the search effort intensity λ in employment. As we
shall see, this phenomenon is empirically irrelevant, as monitoring is virtually always binding.
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The optimal strategy of an unemployed individual has a reservation wage property in
the sense that she accepts a job offer if and only if the wage exceeds a reservation wage
ϕopt. The reservation wage follows from R(ϕopt) = Ru. It can be shown that in the generic















(R(w)−Ru)dFu(w) i ̸= j (3)
Now consider an unemployed individual exposed to monitoring. It is clear that if optimal
formal job search effort sopt1 in the unrestricted case lies above the threshold value s
∗
1, then
the individual will not change her behavior, so a change in s∗1 does not have any effect. We
focus on the more interesting case in which the required effort is binding. The individual
then complies to the formal search requirement by choosing s1 = s
∗
1. In this case, the
optimal strategy of the unemployed worker can be summarized by ϕ∗ and s∗2.
Given the reservation wage and given s∗1, the optimal search effort along the informal










This equation does not have a closed-form solution. There are however two interesting










Here, increased monitoring is relatively ineffective due to effort substitution.8 Second, if







Now there is no direct substitution effect on effort along the informal channel. There is,
however, still an indirect effect of monitoring via the decrease in the reservation wage,






2 all depend on the job offer
arrival rate λ in employment which in turn depends on the monitoring regime.9
8Keeley and Robins (1985) also mention the possibility of substitution of search effort in response to
monitoring of the formal search channel. They do not provide a formal theoretical analysis.
9It is difficult to derive comparative statics results on the signs of the effects of the baseline level of λ (i.e.,
of the level among non-monitored) on search effort and the interaction effects between λ and the presence
of monitoring on search effort and other model outcomes. In a simpler model with one search channel in
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The optimal reservation wage ϕ∗ now follows from equation (2), where the right-hand
side is now maximized over s2 with s1 fixed at s
∗
1. Note that the marginal returns to
formal job search effort are now lower than the marginal costs. The optimal reservation
wage is decreasing in the binding minimum required formal search effort level. Unemployed
workers are forced to behave sub-optimally, so being unemployed becomes less attractive,
and therefore they are willing to accept jobs with lower wages. For essentially the same
reason, unemployed workers would not participate voluntarily in a monitoring scheme
with a binding minimum search effort if the alternative is a monitoring scheme with a
non-binding minimum effort level. Monitoring as such (compared to no monitoring) may
still be attractive if the monitoring effect on λ is positive and sufficiently large. Barring
such admittedly extreme cases, the advantages of monitoring are outside of the individual’s
decision problem. The agency may want to reduce the total payment of UI (i.e., to increase
θ by way of monitoring) because it believes that the advantages of this outweigh a reduction
of the unemployed worker’s present value. We return to this issue when performing policy
simulations using the estimated model.
The reemployment rate θ is given by
θ = (λ1s1 + λ2s2)Fu(ϕ) (4)
with Fu := 1− Fu. Stricter monitoring causes an increase in formal search s1, which posi-
tively affects θ. Next, depending on the value of γ, there may be a direct substitution effect
on s2, which reduces θ. Furthermore, (barring again extreme cases where monitoring has
a large positive autonomous effect on λ) monitoring causes a reduction in the reservation
wage ϕ, which positively affects Fu(ϕ). This reduction in ϕ transmits the indirect effect
on s2, which has a positive effect on s2, which in turn has a positive effect on θ. If γ = 2,
the negative direct substitution effect is absent and increased monitoring has unambigu-
ously positive effects on the reemployment rate. For lower values of γ the over-all effect is
theoretically ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the search channels.
Again barring extreme cases where monitoring has a very large positive autonomous
effect on λ, its effect on the post-unemployment wage is adverse. At the individual level,
the distribution function of the first accepted wage w equals Fu(w)/Fu(ϕ). The lower ϕ, the
lower the average accepted wage. The mean of the subsequent job duration is decreasing
in the wage w. These effects linger on in subsequent jobs. Note that the job duration also
depends on λ which may depend directly on monitoring.
unemployment and no monitoring, an increase of λ has two effects on search effort in unemployment. A
direct effect reflects that it becomes more attractive to be employed to search further for an even better
job. This increases the incentive to replace unemployment by employment, i.e. to increase search effort.
An indirect effect reflects that the expected present value of unemployment increases by the improved
attraction of being employed. This is a reason to cut down the spending on search costs in unemployment,
i.e. to decrease search effort. In numerical analyses we find that the first effect typically dominates.
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4.3 Connecting search effort to the usage of search channels
In this subsection we discuss the connection between the theoretical search effort si and
the indicators of the usage of search channel i. Let n1 denote the number of formal search
methods and n2 the number of informal search methods, with formal and informal as
defined in Subsection 3.1, and with superscripts ∗ and opt denoting the treatment regime.














where α1 and α2 are two unknown scale parameters.
The values of the parameters c1, c2, λ1, λ2, s
∗
1, α1, α2 can be modified in particular ways
without affecting the outcomes of interest. Intuitively, this is because these parameters
all relate search effort to the outcomes of interest, while the actual search effort levels
themselves are unobserved. We deal with this by imposing the innocuous normalization
α1 = α2 = 1, implying that effort is measured as the number of methods used.
Search effort in employment is not observed either, and neither is the number of methods
used in employment. This effort affects the job exit rate (and hence job durations) only. It
is not difficult to see that with optimally chosen effort, the job exit rate depends on λ and
c0 by way of λ
2/c0 only. We thus normalize c0 = 1. Note that this implies that the value
of λ is not directly comparable to the values of λi.
4.4 Parameters, identification and covariates
We assume that wage offers always exceed the mandatory minimum wage wmin and that
the wage offer distributions are exponential,
Fj(w) = 1− exp (−µj(w − wmin)) w ≥ wmin j = u, e (5)




In the data, many wages are close to the mandatory minimum wage, implying that
the lowest reservation wage among unemployed workers is at or below the mandatory
minimum wage. This is necessary to assess the fit of the functional forms of Fj (j = u, e)
(Flinn and Heckman, 1982). Also, it prevents that counterfactual policy scenarios where the
reservation wage drops below the lowest observed wage are driven by untestable functional
form assumptions.
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As a result, the unknown structural parameters in the model are c1, c2, λ1, λ2, s
∗
1, γ, µu, µe,
λ, δ, κ, the direct effect of monitoring on λ, and the discount rate ρ. We fix the latter to
5% annually.
For expositional convenience, we discuss model identification for the case in which the
data do not contain measurement errors or covariates x.10 We start with the observation
that individuals are heterogeneous in terms of b and in terms of their monitoring regime.
Recall that we observe these but we do not observe whether monitoring is binding for
a given individual. From the right-hand tails of the distributions of accepted (and hence
observed) wages, we identify µu and µe. Data on job durations then immediately identify
λ, including the way it depends on the monitoring regime in previous unemployment. The
rate δ is directly identified by the duration in employment until unemployment.
In our data, a fraction of the unemployed are observed to accept wage offers at and
around the minimum wage. By implication, these must have used a reservation wage at or
below wmin. The reemployment rate θ for these individuals satisfies θ = (λ1n1 + λ2n2), and
this enables identification of λ1 and λ2 from the association between n1 and n2 on the one
hand and the unemployment duration on the other. This leaves us to consider the remaining
parameters c1, c2, s
∗
1, γ and κ. A number of outcomes are informative on these. Notably, for
each treatment status, we observe the means of n1, n2, the unemployment duration, and the
post-unemployment wage. (Notice that unemployment durations and post-unemployment
wages are only informative on these parameters if some of the unemployed individuals
do not accept every offer.) The model equations corresponding to these 8 outcomes are
complicated and highly non-linear. Moreover, for each treatment status, we can vary b
in the data, and this gives an additional range of informative observations. For example,
consider the set of non-monitored individuals who accept offers at the minimum wage.
This set corresponds to all values of b below a certain value which can be observed. We
may then consider increasing values of b beyond this value. This must go along with higher
reservation wages. We can then use observed post-unemployment outcomes by b to trace
out the reservation wage as a function of b. The model equations describe how n1 and n2
move along.
The variation in the above-mentioned observed outcomes along with the model equa-
tions capturing individual behavior suffice to uncover the values of c1, c2, s
∗
1, γ and κ. The
equations and numerical simulations suggest that the channel substitution parameter γ is
determined by the extent to which individuals decrease their informal search effort indi-
cator n2 as a result of the increased formal search effort due to monitoring. That is, it
is determined by the cross-regime difference between the associations of n1 and n2. The
relative magnitudes of c1 and c2, in contrast, are determined by how search efforts in the
10The expressions for the likelihood contributions in the next subsection may serve to elucidate the
discussion in this subsection.
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absence of monitoring vary with income flow in unemployment b.11
As noted above, we allow some of the unknown parameters in the structural model
to vary with observed individual characteristics x using parametric specifications. The
job search efficiency parameters while being unemployed λ1 and λ2 are specified as λi =
exp(λ0i + x
′λx). Thus, they have different intercepts but they share covariate effects. The
parameter λ is specified analogously, i.e. as a log-linear function of x with the same vector of
coefficients λx, and with the monitoring regime in previous unemployment as an additional
covariate. Further, µj = exp(µ0j+x
′µ1), where j = u, e. In other words, the log mean wage
offer in excess of the minimum wage has an intercept that depends on the current labor
market state, but the covariate effects are common across these states. Note that a positive
sign of µ1 is associated with a negative effect on wage offers.
The vector x consists of a binary gender indicator, a binary indicator for the city in
which the experiment took place, and an age variable. We do not allow for additional co-
variates, for two reasons. First, as we shall see, estimation of the model specification with
the current number of covariates already reaches the boundary of computational feasibil-
ity. Secondly, recall that the population of interest is defined by the profiling procedure
described in Subsection 2.2. Specifically, out of four types of individuals, we examine the
type that is deemed to have the most favorable characteristics. Ideally, this profiling takes
account of covariate effects on individual labor market outcomes.
We also allow the minimum formal search requirement s∗1 to depend on x. This captures,
for example, that the UI agencies in both cities may apply guidelines differently or that
caseworkers take individual labor market prospects into account. Specifically, we take s∗1 =
ω0 + x
′ω1.
4.5 Measurement errors and likelihood function
We estimate the model with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method. In this subsec-
tion we only briefly discuss the derivation of the likelihood function, as it closely resembles
the derivations in the literature on structural estimation of search models (e.g. Eckstein
and Van den Berg, 2007). When specifying the log likelihood function we allow for mea-
surement errors both in observed wages and search effort. The introduction of measurement
errors serves two purposes. First, the estimation results become less sensitive to outliers.
11It is interesting to contrast this to basic search models with endogenous search effort without mon-
itoring. Wiith additive channels (i.e., γ = 2), if effort is not observed, the parameters λi and ci are not
separately identified when relying on the usual outcome variables. Observing effort is thus crucial for iden-
tification. The underlying intuition is that the usual outcome variables are more sensitive to λi than to ci
whereas effort along channel i is equally sensitive to each of these two parameters. And this is because the
standard outcomes depend on effort along channel i multiplied by λi. It should, however, be pointed out
that many interesting model features and predictions do not require separately identifiable λi and ci.
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Secondly, the estimated variances of the measurement errors are informative on the extent
to which the observed variation in an outcome can be explained by the model, i.e. they are
informative on the fit of the model. For ease of presentation we suppress covariates x and
individual indices in the remainder of this subsection.
The quantification of a likelihood contribution for given parameter values always re-
quires the calculation of the individual’s optimal strategy. The latter is formulated in terms
of optimal search efforts and the reservation wage. As the model does not have a closed-
form solution for the optimal strategy, it must be computed numerically. Of course, when
computing the optimal strategy, we take into account whether or not the unemployed
worker is exposed to job search monitoring.
To proced, we relate model to data. First, recall from the subsection on identification
that we impose a normalization that effectively delivers that the actual number of used
search methods per channel equals the actual search effort per channel. We allow the
observed formal and informal search efforts to contain individual- and channel-specific
measurement errors, according to s̃i = si+εi (with εi normally distributed with mean zero















Obviously, only those individuals who answered the questions on search channels in the
survey (as captured by, say, Q = 1, as opposed to Q = 0) contribute to this part of the
likelihood function. But when estimating the model all 393 individuals in the administrative
data are taken into account since they contribute to the other parts of the likelihood
function discussed below.
For unemployed workers devoting effort s1 and s2 to formal and informal job search
respectively and who have a reservation wage ϕ, the reemployment hazard equals
θ = (λ1s1 + λ2s2) exp (−µu(ϕ− wmin))
which implies the following likelihood contribution of an unemployment spell of length t1,
given the true s1, s2,
ℓ2(t1, d1) = θ
d1 exp(−θt1)
where d1 indicates whether exit to work is observed.
If the individual is observed to find work (d1 = 1), the wage in the first job equals w1 is
drawn from the density µ exp(−µu(w1−ϕ)). However, this wage is unobserved and instead
we observe the wage w̃1 that contains measurement errors. Conditional on the true wage,












Within the first job, the transition rate to the next job is
θw(w1) = λse(w1) exp (−µe(w1 − wmin))
while the lay-off rate is δ. This implies that the likelihood contribution provided by the
first job spell given the true w1 is
ℓ4(t2, dw, du|w1) = θw(w1)dwδdu exp (−(θw(w1) + δ)t2)
where dw indicates a job-to-job transition and du indicates a lay-off. If the individual moves
to a new job, the new wage w2 must exceed w1. Notice that because of measurement errors,
the observed new wage w̃2 may actually be lower than w̃1. We take the wage measurement
errors to be i.i.d. across jobs for a given individual. The likelihood contribution provided
by the observed wage w̃2 given w1 is
ℓ5(w̃2|w1) = Φ
(











As a result, the total likelihood contribution can be expressed as




ℓ3(w̃1|w1)ℓ4(t2, dw, du|w1)ℓ5(w̃2|w1)dwµu exp(−µu(w1 − ϕ))dw1
)d1
The specification of the likelihood function allows for concentrating out the estimates of
the variances of the measurement errors of the search effort (these only appear in ℓ1).
The maximum likelihood estimates for these parameters are the sample variances of the
difference between observed efforts s̃1 and s̃2 and optimal efforts s1 and s2.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 3 provides the parameter estimates of the structural model. The results show that it is
important to allow for heterogeneity. Ignoring covariates reduces the number of parameters
by nine, while the log likelihood value increases by 35.4 points. A likelihood ratio test thus
indicates joint significance.
The estimated search efficiency parameters of formal search (λ1) and informal search
(λ2) are very similar, suggesting that one additional formal search method is equally likely
to generate a job offer as one additional informal search method. The search efficiency
parameters are higher for women, younger workers and for individuals living in City 1.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates for the structural model.
estimate (s.e.)
Formal-search channel: log λ1: intercept -3.294 (0.624)
Informal-search channel: log λ2: intercept -3.414 (0.507)
On-the-job search: log λ: intercept -7.095 (0.134)
Female (in λ1, λ2, λ) 0.240 (0.098)
Older than 40 (in λ1, λ2, λ) -0.274 (0.098)
City 2 (in λ1, λ2, λ) -0.179 (0.093)
Monitoring (in λ) 0.022 (0.059)
Wage offers: log µu: intercept unemployed -4.981 (0.085)
Wage offers: log µe: intercept employed -5.477 (0.095)
Female (in µu, µe) 0.799 (0.096)
Older than 40 (in µu, µe) -0.149 (0.083)
City 2 (in µu, µe) -0.214 (0.082)
σε (measurement error wages) 92.749 (6.105)
Minimum formal-search requirement s∗: intercept 0.689 (0.324)
Female -0.210 (0.267)
Older than 40 -0.168 (0.255)
City 2 0.321 (0.308)
Costs formal search log c1 3.058 (0.997)
Costs informal search log c2 2.849 (0.657)
γ 1.147 (0.184)
log δ (job destruction rate) -6.116 (0.142)
κ (non-pecuniary utility of unemployment) 0.484 (0.090)
Number of individuals 393
Log likelihood -4666.8
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Having been exposed to the monitoring policy has no significant effect on the efficiency of
on-the-job search. Also, this coefficient is small, indicating that the monitoring policy does
not have effects beyond the search for the first job. This is an important result. Apparently,
the difference in the job search environment between employment and unemployment is
so large that employed job seekers do not benefit from search skills learned during excess
formal search in the monitoring regime. As we shall see in Subsection 5.3, this result has
implications for the welfare ranking of the policy regimes.
The wage offer distribution is different in employment than in unemployment. Employed
workers receive, on average, higher wage offers (log µu > log µe). Men, older workers and
individuals living in City 2 receive, on average, higher wage offers than their counterparts.
But the coefficient of age is only marginally significant. The intercept of the search efficiency
parameter for employed workers (λe) cannot be compared easily to λ1 and λ2 since on-the-
job search effort does not have the same unit.
The main policy parameters are those associated to the minimum requirements on
formal job search effort. The highest values of s∗1 are attained for younger men living in
City 2 (about 1.01). However, none of the covariate effects is significant and also jointly
these effects are insignificant (p-value for joint significance is 0.30). The minimum search
requirements are binding for 86% of the individuals in the treatment group. For 14%, the
unrestricted optimal formal search effort sopt1 is above the minimum requirements s
∗
1.
The formal search channel is slightly more costly than the informal search channel. The
difference is not significant. Since also λ1 and λ2 are close to each other, search along both
channels is about equally efficient. The estimate of the parameter γ equals 1.15. Therefore,
the search channels are close substitutes. The model predicts that in the control group 38%
of all first jobs are found through the formal search channel. In the treatment group with
the job search monitoring this is 52%.
The weekly job separation rate is only 0.0022. So the workers lose their job on av-
erage every 453 weeks. The latter reflects that the individuals in our data are the least
disadvantaged among the inflow into unemployment.
5.2 Fit of the model
Table 4 shows observed averages for the main outcome variables and the corresponding
predictions from the estimated model over the sample members. The first two columns
replicate the corresponding columns in Table 1. To make a fair comparison, the predictions
in the third and fourth column are only based on those individuals for whom we observe
the corresponding outcomes (recall Subsection 3.2). When computing summary statistics
for the hazards we condition on the covariates included in the structural model (recall
again Subsection 3.2). The final column of the table reports the p-values for the difference
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in model prediction between the treatment and control group over the sample members
(not taking standard errors of the model parameters into account). Analogous p-values for
the observed averages are in Table 1.
The predictions for search methods usage are very close to the observed average values.
The difference in predicted formal-search methods usage between treatment and control
group is significant at the 10% level. The re-employment hazards are quite similar to the
observed hazards, and the difference between treatment and control group in predicted
re-employment rate is not significant.
The average of the first wage after unemployment is predicted to have a value that
is about 3% lower than in the data, and the observed difference between treated and
controls is somewhat larger than the predicted difference. The model predicts higher wages
in the second job than what is observed in the data, but with a similar difference between
treatment and control group, which is also significant for the predicted wages. The average
second-wage levels reflect the functional form of the wage offer distributions and their
truncated versions (truncated from below at the first wage), as well as the distribution of
measurement noise in wage data. We return to the estimated shapes of these distributions
later in this subsection.
In the model, the job separation rate is identical across individuals. Its estimated value
is close to what is observed in the data. The model specification imposes no difference
by treatment status either. The job-to-job hazard is slightly higher for the treated, as is
also the case in the data. However, the predicted difference between treatment and control
group is somewhat smaller than in the data and not significant. Note that in general the
p-values in Tables 1 and 4 are in accordance to each other.
We can also use the estimated variances of the measurement errors as measure of the
goodness-of-fit of the model. Comparing the variance of the measurement error in wages
with the variance in observed wages shows that only 25% of the variance in observed wages
is due to measurement error. Since the individuals in our sample are quite homogeneous in
terms of current labor market status and prospects and we only allow for a limited set of
individual characteristics, measurement errors are quite small. For the formal and informal
job search effort, the model explains slightly more than 55% of the variance of the observed
number of search channels used by the unemployed workers.
Finally, we compare the observed distribution of first wages after unemployment with
the corresponding predicted density. Figure 1 shows a kernel estimate of the density of
observed first wages and the predicted density of observed first wages. The model assigns
somewhat more probability mass to the left tail of the distribution.
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Table 4: Fit of the model.
Data Predictions
Treatment Control Treatment Control p-value for
equality
Measure of formal search 0.79 0.52 0.76 0.53 0.098
Measure of informal search 0.79 1.00 0.77 0.97 0.235
Hazard to first job 0.044 0.042 0.045 0.042 0.233
Wage in first job 413 424 402 404 0.834
Job separation hazard 0.0023 0.0024 0.0022 0.0022 –
Job-to-job hazard 0.0088 0.0068 0.0080 0.0072 0.743
Wage in second job 460 434 480 463 0.000
Notes: We condition on the covariates included in the structural model when computing the summary
statistics for the hazards (recall Subsection 3.2). The model predictions are only based on those individuals
for whom we observe the corresponding outcomes.
Figure 1: Observed and predicted first wages.
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5.3 Counterfactual policy evaluations
We use the estimated structural model for counterfactual policy simulations. Recall from
Subsection 4.4 that effects of policy changes that reduce reservation wages are identified.
However, assuming that the wage offer distributions Fu and Fe are invariant to policy
changes means that we abstract from equilibrium effects in the counterfactual analyses.
Monitoring schemes. In Table 5 we provide the results of some policy simulations. In
the first column, we describe the situation in which the UI agency does not impose any job
search requirements (or implements any other policy measures). Of course, the numbers in
this column coincide with the predictions from the estimated model for what we call the
control group. We mainly focus on the first 26 weeks after starting collecting UI. Without
job search requirements about 66% of the individuals start working within 26 weeks. The
expected costs of the eligibility checks over the first six months are about 62.80 euro.
In column (2) we consider the case that all workers are subject to job search monitoring.
These numbers coincide with the predictions from the estimated model for the treatment
group. Recall that the monitoring is binding only for about 86% of the individuals in
our sample. The remaining 14% workers have unrestricted formal search effort above the
minimum requirement. These individuals are still affected by the policy since this also
increases job search efficiency when being employed.
Compared to the situation without job search monitoring, formal search effort is much
higher and informal search effort is substantially lower. The reemployment hazard slightly
increases, which also means that after 26 weeks the fraction of individuals finding work
increases with three percentage points from 66% to 69%. Therefore, the present value of
expected benefit payments decreases.
Because the reservation wage12 decreases somewhat when going from column (1) to (2),
the expected first wage is slightly lower in column (2). The costs of providing job search
monitoring are 152.46 euro per individual entering unemployment. The monthly monitoring
meetings include the eligibility checks. So providing monitoring increases the policy costs
by about 90 euro. The monitoring policy has two effects. First, job search monitoring
restricts unemployed workers in their search behavior, which they dislike. Second, the
policy has a small positive effect on on-the-job search efficiency, which increases the value
of being unemployed. Because formal and informal search effort are found to be close
substitutes with similar efficiency, the second effect dominates in the expected present
value of unemployment. This increases from 543,208 to 545,921. However, note that the
parameter driving the second effect (the effect of monitoring on on-the-job search efficiency)
12In the remainder of the paper, we simply call the reservation wage to be the maximum of (i) the
reservation wage as defined in the model and (ii) the mandatory minimum wage. Clearly, both reservation
wage definitions are behaviorally and observationally equivalent.
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Table 5: Policy simulations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal search channel 0.532 0.760 2 0.536† 0.539†
Informal search channel 0.975 0.793 0.212 0.982† 0.990†
Job founds informally 61.9% 48.2% 8.4% 61.9% 61.9%
Re-employment hazard 0.0427 0.0459 0.0746 0.0433† 0.0439†
First (weekly) wage 403.45 397.55 382.88 402.71 402.67
Max{reservation wage,wmin} 265.74 245.17 245.00 264.66† 263.69†
Present value of unemployment 543,208 545,921 534,975 543,349 543,333
Monitoring binding 86% 100%
Agency costs 62.80 152.46 152.46 59.32 59.17
Bonus payment 98.94 106.49
Prob. work within 26 weeks 0.6608 0.6906 0.8570 0.6670 0.6670
Present value benefits 11052 9843 5413 10936 10932
idem after 26 weeks 6339 6095 4550 6296 6282
Sanction level (at 10% detection) 256 2560
”Welfare” 532,097 535,925 529,409 532,254 532,236
Explanatory notes:




(3) Intense monitoring s∗1 = 2.
(4) Reemployment bonus 150 euros (effort, hazard and reservation wage in first week re-
ported).
(5) Decreasing reemployment bonus (start 260 euros, 10 euros decrease per week).
The reported reservation wage is the maximum of the quantity defined in Subsection 4.1
and the mandatory minimum wage.
† Due to bonuses the model is non-stationary; these are outcomes in first week of unem-
ployment.
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is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that the welfare effect of
the policy is not important. To proceed, we focus on a “welfare measure” that subtracts the
present value of benefits and policy costs from the expected present value of unemployment.
The monitoring increases this measure from 532,097 to 535,925. The standard error of
the estimated welfare measure in the absence of monitoring is 21,089. The increase in
welfare is thus not significant. The increase is about 0.7% of the expected present value
of unemployment which can be considered as measure for total consumption.13 It should
be noted that the welfare measure and the expected present value of unemployment are
mostly determined by future wage earnings in employment.
Column (3) provides the results of more intense monitoring where every individual is
subject to the formal search effort requirement s∗1 = 2. Individuals then reduce informal
search effort to 0.212. The change in search effort causes the total search effort and the
reemployment hazard to increase substantially. Due to this extreme monitoring, about 86%
of individuals find work within 26 weeks of unemployment.
A binding minimum formal search effort forces unemployed individuals to behave sub-
optimally, so they would prefer to deviate from it. To ensure that they nevertheless comply
with the minimum effort level, the unemployment insurance agency can impose financial
punishments for violations. We can use our estimated model to compute the required size
of such sanctions to be sufficiently deterring to prevent violations. Since individuals are
heterogeneous in characteristics and in their benefits level, the required sanction level dif-
fers between unemployed workers. Furthermore, the detection rate of non-compliance is
important. In our computations we assume that if an unemployed worker does not comply,
each time unit of one week the probability of getting a sanction equals 0.1. It turns out that
in order to force all unemployed workers to comply to the high formal search requirement
s∗1 = 2, the financial punishment should be at least 2560 euro. Furthermore, if the sanction
is below 1370 euro, no unemployed worker complies to the formal search requirements.
These are large numbers in the light of the sanction magnitudes in the regime that was
prevalent at the time (see Subsection 2.2). This suggests that enforcement of such a regime
requires a higher detection probability, either through a higher sampling rate of individ-
uals by the monitoring agency or through a higher probability of observing a violation
conditional on having sampled a non-compliant individual.
The sanctions above apply to the counterfactual strict monitoring regime. We can also
compute the size of the sanctions for the actual monitoring policy. Recall that the minimum
search requirements under this monitoring scheme are not binding for 19% individuals, so
for these unemployed workers the threat of a sanction is not necessary. To accomplish that
all unemployed workers comply to the minimum formal search requirements, the size of
13Consumption-equivalent welfare can be seen as being equal to the expected present value of unem-
ployment if the individual under consideration is a newly unemployed individual.
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sanctions should be at least 256 euro. This magnitude is lower than the sanction magnitudes
in the regime that was prevalent at the time, which explains why (according to the data)
sanctions are virtually absent in that regime. This constitutes an external validation of our
structural estimation results.
Reemployment bonuses. Next, we consider policies that combat moral hazard without
monitoring. In particular, we focus on reemployment bonuses and unemployment benefits
reductions. We compare these policies to monitoring, invoking cost neutrality on the part
of the UI agency or neutrality in terms of the expected present value of unemployment.
For reemployment bonuses14 we consider two alternative schemes. First, we show sim-
ulation results where an unemployed worker receives a one-time bonus when finding work
within 26 weeks after becoming unemployed. The model becomes non-stationary as bonuses
are tied to a specific period of being unemployed. The level of the bonus is chosen such that
the expected bonus payment (and other policy costs) roughly equal the costs of providing
job search monitoring. This implies that in column (4) we focus on a reemployment bonus
of 150 euro. The reemployment bonus slightly increases both formal and informal search
effort, and it reduces the reservation wage somewhat right at the start of unemployment.
As unemployment proceeds, individuals modestly increase their search effort and lower
their reservation wage, until 26 weeks. The increase in search effort is proportional, such
that the fraction of jobs found informally remains unaffected. Overall, the exit rate within
26 weeks is only slightly higher due to the reemployment bonus. The reemployment bonus
slightly increases welfare. Not only do the unemployed workers benefit from a higher value
of search, the total costs (benefits, checking, bonus payments) to the UI agency are slightly
lower than in the no-policy case. It should be noted that we abstract from direct costs
of the bonus system. This includes costs made to prevent abuse, i.e. to verify that the
accepted job is held for a certain amount of time.
In the second bonus scheme, individuals receive 260 euros for finding work within one
week, while every subsequent week this bonus decreases with 10 euros, so that the bonus
is zero after 26 weeks of unemployment. This bonus scheme shares some features of the
optimal unemployment insurance scheme as discussed by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
In particular, accepting a job becomes less attractive each period. So, individuals are
encouraged to devote more effort to search, and to accept more job offers. Our simulation
results show that after 26 weeks reemployment is about the same as in the previous bonus
scheme, while the expected bonus payments are slightly higher. In the first few weeks
reemployment rates are higher than in (4) while towards the end of the first 26 weeks of
14Experimental studies on the effect of re-employment bonuses are surveyed in Meyer (1995). See also
Card and Hyslop (2005) for a more recent study. Usually the effects on re-employment are found to be
positive.
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unemployment they are lower. In terms of value of search, costs for the UI agency and
welfare, the two bonus schemes have very similar outcomes.
Because the monitoring policy also has a small effect after finding work, this policy
generates higher welfare than a bonus scheme. In case the reemployment bonus increases
to about 5000 euro, the welfare in both schemes becomes similar. Such sizes are unrealistic
and are also likely to affect the composition of the inflow into unemployment. We may sum-
marize the contrast between monitoring and reemployment bonuses as follows. Monitoring
generates a decrease of unemployment durations. In this process it causes effort substitu-
tion and utility loss for the unemployed worker. However, due to job mobility, the relative
size of this loss and the long-run effects on wages are small. Monitoring is cheap for the UI
agency. Replacing such a cheap monitoring system with an equally cheap reemployment
bonus system is not useful: the latter exerts almost no effects.
Unemployment benefits reductions. We now compare monitoring to reductions in
the benefits level b. This naturally begs the question what is the rationale behind unem-
ployment benefits in the first place. Recall that the model is not an equilibrium model, and
the existence of a UI system is not justified within the model. We do not allow for savings,
and benefits simply provide an income stream such that the individual survives while out
of work. We assume that benefits are funded out of taxes on labor earnings, but we do not
close the model with an equilibrium budget equation. An alternative approach would be to
allow for risk aversion and to include savings and assets into the model. However, such mod-
els are intrinsically more demanding from a computational point of view, and our analysis
is already close to the boundary of computational feasibility. Perhaps more importantly,
our data do not contain any information on assets or savings. Accordingly, our counter-
factual analyses with the benefits level are primarily intended to quantify policy effects at
the individual level. This in turn sheds light on the extent to which post-unemployment
conditions matter for the policy effects and the average treatment effects.
For many unemployed workers participation in the monitoring policy increases the value
of search because the policy has a small positive (but insignificant) effect on on-the-job
search efficiency. Therefore, most workers would not be willing to accept a benefits cut
to avoid the monitoring. Furthermore, those unemployed workers for whom the value of
search is lower when being exposed to the monitoring scheme would on average only accept
a benefits cut of about 3.6% to avoid monitoring. This confirms the anecdotal evidence
that complaints about the monitoring policy among those assigned to the treatment group
were absent.
We finish this subsection by examining how the effects of monitoring and a benefits
reduction depend on the benefits level. In Figure 2 we show the effects of monitoring
and a 20% benefit reduction on search behavior and reemployment of a representative
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individual, as a function of the UI benefits levels. First, without any policy intervention,
both formal and informal job search effort are decreasing in the benefits level. Only for
unemployed workers with high benefits does the reservation wage exceed the minimum
wage. The reemployment rate is decreasing in the benefits level, and this decline accelerates
if the reservation wage is higher. Job search monitoring is not binding for individuals with
low benefits levels, as their formal search effort already is above the minimum search
requirements. The impact of job search monitoring on formal search efforts becomes larger
as the benefits level increases. This is because monitoring mainly affects individuals with
low formal search effort, and these are individuals with high benefits. The substitution
away from informal search also increases in the benefits level. In comparison, the benefits
reduction affects individuals at all levels of unemployment benefits. As with monitoring,
the effect on search effort becomes more substantial as the benefit level increases. Both job
search monitoring and benefits reductions tend to depress reservation wages, and therefore
reemployment rates increase in either case. In sum, the main qualitative difference is that,
at low benefits levels, monitoring does not exert an influence, whereas a benefits reduction
does. Notice that a proportionate decrease of the benefits level is stronger in absolute terms
for individuals with high benefits levels. If the benefits decrease involves a fixed amount,
or if individuals use a logarithmic utility flow function, then the findings would be less
dramatic.
We may summarize the contrast between monitoring and benefits reductions as fol-
lows. For the UI agency the benefits reduction is the cheaper policy, even though the
corresponding gain in reemployment rates is smaller. From an average welfare point of
view, the benefits reduction seems to be the most attractive. However, implementation of
a benefits scheme that depends at the individual level on whether monitoring is binding
or not seems unrealistically complex. A benefits reduction across the full population is
unattractive among workers with adverse labor market conditions. Therefore a benefits
reduction policy may not have political support.
5.4 The importance of job mobility
The labor market in the Netherlands is characterized by a high degree of flexibility and
job mobility (see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg, 2003). Our data show a substantial de-
gree of mobility, often associated with relatively large wage increases. Recall from Table
5 that for most unemployed workers the reservation wage equals the minimum wage. In
unemployment, the strategic rejection of low wage offers to wait for better offers is not
optimal compared to using the first job as a stepping stone towards better paying jobs.
Thus, virtually all job offers are acceptable to the unemployed. Indeed, our results indicate
that almost half of the unemployed workers even accept a wage below their benefits level.
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Figure 2: Simulated effect of job search monitoring and a 20% benefits reduction for a
representative unemployed worker.
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To study the extent to which job mobility drives the results, we examine model outcomes
if we rule out job mobility (and job destruction) by construction in the model. In that
case the effects of accepting lower wage offers are permanent. Table 6 gives the results.
A comparison with Table 5 shows that poorer post-unemployment circumstances reduce
effort through both search channels. The consequence is that the re-employment hazard
drops dramatically. Indeed, the possibility of job mobility is a major determinant of the
well-being and the outcomes of unemployed workers. As such it is much more important
than monitoring or the other policy instruments that we considered, with the exception of
the counterfactual intense monitoring regime.
Relatively speaking, monitoring is now more effective, as the weekly re-employment
hazard increases by more than 50%. Without job mobility, the unemployed workers prefer
a lower level of search effort in general, and therefore the substitution between formal and
informal search induced by monitoring is higher. This can be seen e.g. by comparing which
fraction of the jobs is found informally. The intense monitoring (Column (3)) is again
efficient in stimulating reemployment.
To assess long-run effects on wages, it is useful to examine the present value of un-
employment (i.e. the expected present value of all current and future income streams).
This value now decreases upon monitoring, while it increases if job mobility is possible.
We conclude from this that job mobility helps to counteract adverse long-run effects of
monitoring on income in employment.
6 Sensitivity analyses
To assess the robustness of the results, we extend the model in a number of ways. First,
we extend the specification of the instantaneous utility of being unemployed by taking
u(b) = κ0 + κ1b. It turns out that the parameter κ0 is not significantly different from
0. This parameter is even estimated to be negative, implying that individuals dislike be-
ing unemployed for nonpecuniary reasons. It should be noted that κ1 is estimated to be
somewhat higher than in the baseline model.
In a second extension we allow the wage offer distribution of the formal and the informal
channel to differ. Admittedly, such inference is problematic in the light of the fact that
we do not observe through which channel unemployed workers find a job. Therefore, if the
difference between the estimated distributions is insignificant then this should not be taken
as strong evidence that they are actually close. As it turned out, and with this caveat in
mind, the estimated distributions were estimated to be close to each other and the small
difference was also not significant.
Finally, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity by allowing the cost function of job
search effort among the unemployed to depend on unobserved characteristics. This is in
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Table 6: Counterfactual conditions: no job mobility.
(1) (2) (3)
Formal search channels 0.207 0.750 2
Informal search channels 0.379 0.172 0.049
Job founds informally 61.9% 16.5% 2.1%
Re-employment hazard 0.0194 0.0306 0.0700
First (weakly) wage 392.59 383.38 382.71
Reservation wage 254.88 245.67 245.00
Present value of unemployment 266,696 255,293 248,043
Monitoring binding 100% 100%
Agency costs 81.05 152.46 152.46
Prob. work within 26 weeks 0.365 0.545 0.837
Present value benefits 114,211 14189 5794
benefits (26 weeks) 8317 7042 4745




(3) Intense monitoring s∗1 = 2.
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line with Fougère, Pradel and Roger (2009) who have a “random effect” component in
their cost function that may differ across individuals. We adopt a discrete distribution,
effectively allowing for high unit cost and low unit cost individuals. As it turns out, during
the optimization of the log likelihood function, the mass points of the distribution converge
to each other, and hence the variance converges to its boundary value zero. Thus, allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity in search costs does not yield a significant improvement of
the model fit.
7 Conclusions
Since the monitoring policy regime is relatively cheap, this policy is cost effective for the
unemployment insurance agency. We find that the effect of monitoring on the job search
efficiency in subsequent employment is small and insignificant. Ignoring for the moment the
statistical insignificance, the point estimates predict that many workers benefit somewhat
from exposure to the policy. On average, the monitoring policy is more attractive than a
benefits reduction (which is cheaper for the UI agency) or the provision of reemployment
bonuses. The introduction of a more severe monitoring regime has a substantial effect,
but such a policy would also require substantial punitive sanctions to induce unemployed
workers to comply.
On the methodological side, this paper shows that a social experiment with data from
a survey as well as from registers can be fruitfully used to estimate job search models
that deal with non-trivial search technologies and post-unemployment outcomes. Indeed,
the structural model captures the key differences in labor market behavior and outcomes
between the treatment and control group observed in the data. The structural estimation
results allow for counterfactual analyses of a range of relevant alternative policy measures.
This provides insights and results that cannot be obtained with reduced form evaluations.
Because of the equipoise principle, social experiments are often deemed unethical if the
expected treatment effect is large. Also, social experiments are often modest in size. This
makes the combination of social experiments and structural inference, where restrictions
from economic theory are used to complement the empirical evidence, particularly fruitful.
We find that post-unemployment outcomes are important determinants of the effec-
tiveness of active labor market policies for the unemployed. This is not just a matter of
active labor market policies affecting post-unemployment outcomes. Rather, the conditions
after unemployment influence the extent to which a policy measure exerts short-run and
long-run effects. Long-run effects may be unforeseen or may be deemed irrelevant by the UI
agency, since the latter is primarily concerned about total UI payments. However, they may
be important for the unemployed. In the paper we focus on the role of post-unemployment
job mobility on the long-run effects of monitoring. The option of job mobility affects the
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unemployed individuals’ behavior, but it also affects the extent to which undesirable long-
run effects of monitoring on wages are mitigated. We find that a high job mobility slightly
reduces the short-run impact of monitoring on reemployment, but perhaps more interest-
ing, job mobility helps to counteract adverse long-run effects of monitoring on income in
employment. To put it simple: with a high job mobility it does not matter so much that
monitoring drives unemployed workers into a first job with a low wage. We view these
results as important for policy makers. They may also serve as useful inputs for studies of
optimal UI and optimal active labor market policy designs.
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